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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
plished by reference to the traditional competency-credibility dicoto-
my, since that is the focal point of the problem.
The author concludes that in order to justify the existence of the
Massachusetts view over the New York procedure, more reasoning
is necessary than an attack on the jury determination of a factual
issue.
JEROME JAYNES
OFFICERS-ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION-LEGISLATOR CREATING
OFFICE OR INCREASING EMOLUMENTS-In an original proceeding
to determine the right of three candidates to run for the offices of
governor and secretary of state, where each candidate had been a
member of the previous legislature, which had passed a small across-
the-board salary increase for all state offices, the Utah Supreme
Court held, one judge dissenting, that the Utah constitutional pro-
vision' forbidding any legislator during his term of office to seek
any civil office which had been created, or for which the emoluments
had been increased during his term of office, was not violated by
the legislature's general "cost-of-living" salary increase, 2 and that
the legislators were eligible to hold such state offices. The chief
justice dissented on the grounds that the constitutional provision
was clear and unambiguous, and that the majority, by judicial fiat,
had expanded the intent of the constitution. Shields v. Toronto, 395
P.2d 829 (Utah 1964).
More than half the states,3 following the example of the federal
constitution, 4 have enacted constitutional provisions similar to the
Utah provision interpreted above. These jurisdictions have generally
construed such provisions strictly and have barred legislators from
running for offices created during their term of office, such as
special legal counsel, 5 justice of the peace,6 industrial commis-
sion,7 war emergency council,8 levee commissioner,9 city police
judge,10 and circuit judge." Courts have also barred legislators
when the emoluments were increased for such offices as county
1. UTAH CosT. art. VI, § 7.
2. The salary of the secretary of state was raised from $10,500 to $11,000, and the
governor's Was raised from $13,200 to $15,000.
3. E.g., FLA. CONST. art 3, § 5; MINN. CONsT. art. 4, § 9; N.D. CONST. art. 2, § 39;
S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 12; UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 7.
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2.
5. Palmer v. State, 11 S.D. 78, 75 N.W. 818 (1898) ; but of. State ex. rel. Landis v.
Futch, 122 Fla. 837, 165 So. 907 (1936).
6. Kimble v. Bender, 173 Md. 608, 196 Atl. 409 (1938).
7. State ex. rel. Jugler v. Grover, 102 Utah 41, 125 P.2d 807 (1942) ; but cf. Shields
v. Toronto, 395 P.2d 829 (Utah 1964).
8. Opinion of the Justices, 244 Ala. 386, 13 So. 2d 674 (1943).
9. Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273, 72 Am. Dec. 169 (1858).
10. Montgomery v. State ex rel. Enslen, 107 Ala. 372, 18 So. 157 (1895).
11. State v. Porter, 1 Ala. 688 (1840).
RECENT CASES
commissioner, 12 circuit judge,13 county auditor,' and state comp-
troller. 5
A more liberal approach has excluded as an increase in the
emoluments of an office, a legislative enactment which increases the
state's contribution to the salary of a civil office but which does not
affect the total salary of the position.'6 Likewise, retirement bene-
fits for supreme court judges have been construed as contingent
benefits and not as emoluments.1 7 In 1961 the North Dakota Supreme
Court' permitted William Guy to assume the office of governor
by ruling that the purchase of an automobile for the use of the
governor, payment of expenses of the governor's office for previous
years, and an increase in social security coverage for the governor
were not included in the meaning of the term emoluments, and,
therefore, a legislator serving during the term of the enactment of
these increases could seek the office of governor during his legislative
term. Although the North Dakota court has never treated the question
of whether direct salary increases would bar a legislator from
seeking such office, the Utah court implies that the North Dakota
decision in the Guy case, by analogy, provides precedent for allowing
moderate salary increases on an "across-the-board basis in keeping
with the steadily rising costs of living.'
'19
Prior to the Utah decision, only Florida and South Dakota had
held that a direct salary increase for a civil office would not prohibit
a legislator from seeking such office during the term of the increase.
Florida in 1954,20 overruling previous decisions, 2' and in spite of
a vigorous dissent, held that an increase in the governor's salary
was only for the then current term; and that the death of the
governor in mid-term, necessitating a special election, could not
have been contemplated by a legislator who sought to fill the vacant
office. The court, in upholding this decision in 1963,22 again allowed
a legislator to seek the office of governor during the same term of a
salary increase by reasoning that because the legislature had been
silent since the 1954 opinion, its earlier broad interpretation was still
controlling. South Dakota in 195423 permitted Joe Foss to seek the
office of governor after he had participated in legislative enactments
12. State v. Erickson, 180 Minn. 246, 230 N.W. 637 (1930).
13. State ex rel. Hawthorne v. Wlseheart, 158 Fla. 267, 28 So. 2d 589 (1946) ; but cf.
Adams v. Matthews, 156 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1963); State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So. 2d
114 (Fla. 1954).
14. State ex rel. Pennick v. Hall, 26 Wash. 2d 172, 173 P.2d 153 (1946).
15. State ex rel. Fraser v. Gay, 158 Fla. 465, 28 So. 2d 901 (1947) ; but cf. Adams v.
Matthews, supra note 13; State ex reL West v. Gray, supra note 13.
16. State ex rel. Benson V. Schmahl, 125 Minn. 104, 145 N.W. 794 (1914); State eX
reL Johnson v. Nye, 148 Wis. 659, 135 N.W. 126 (1912).
17. State ex reL Todd v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 145, 82 P.2d 173 (1938).
18. State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1961).
19. Shields v. Toronto, 395 P.2d 829, 831 (Utah 1964).
20. State ex rel. West v. Gray, supra note 13.
21. State ex rel. Fraser v. Gay, supra note 15; State ex rel. Hawthorne v. Wiseheart,
supra note 13.
22. Adams v. Matthews, supra note 13.
23. State ex rel Grigsby v. Ostroot, 75 S.D. 819, 64 N.W.2d 62 (1954).
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providing across-the-board salary increases for state offices. The
court reasoned that a more recent constitutional provision2' enabling
legislators to increase the salaries of state officers as well as their
own, superseded the earlier prohibitive constitutional provision,
because by any other interpretation, legislators could not increase
their own salaries without resigning.
The Utah Supreme Court has made a bold, practical step toward
the implementation of modern administrative practices in state
government. The court correctly reasons that the right to vote for
the candidate of one's choice is fundamental, 25 and that the con-
stitutional restriction regarding the creation or increase of emolu-
ments of civil offices should be limited to obvious "improper
machinations. ' 26 Although the electorate rejected the legislature's
recent attempt to amend North Dakota's constitutional provision,
27
the Utah approach would be a sensible alternative for the North
Dakota court, to facilitate the enactment of needed salary increases




INSURANCE-DEFENSE OF ACTIONS-DUTY TO DEFEND BEYOND
POLICY LIMITS-PLAINTIFFS, the insurers of certain bottled gas
distributors, sought a declaratory judgment relieving them of the
cost of defending suits arising out of a bottled gas explosion October
31, 1963. Plaintiffs admitted liability and joined a number of potential
claimants as defendants. The United States District Court found
that the fair settlement value of the suits filed would exceed the
insurance coverage and held that by interpleading the amount of
the policies, the plaintiffs had discharged their obligation under the
insurance contracts and were under no duty to defend suits brought
against their assureds. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F.
Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
An insurer's duty to defend, in the name of the insured, all suits
which fall within the limits of coverage is well settled.' The principal
controversy involves an insurer's duty to defend after coverage is
exhausted. Where an insurer has defended an action approaching
or equalling the policy limits and has asked to be relieved of further
24. S.D. CONST. art. 21, § 2.
25. Shields v. Toronto, supra note 19, at 832; accord, State ex rel. Benson v. Schmahl.
supra note 16, at 795.
26. Shields v. Toronto, supra note 19, at 831.
27. N.D. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 453, defeated In the primary election of June 30, 1964,
by 59,955 to 46,029.
28. See Shields v. Toronto, supra note 19, at 834.
1. See generally 31 N.D.L. Rev. 67 (1955).
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